Judge rules JLSC secretary can testify for Commission

HIGH COURT Judge Peter Jamadar has ruled that instead of individual members of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission (JLSC) testifying in a matter currently before Justice Jamadar, the commission’s secretary was competent to give evidence on the members’ behalf, including Chief Justice Sat Sharma.

The secretary, Cheryll Hay, he said, was competent to give an interpretation of the commissioners’ discussions at a meeting earlier this year, when the decision was taken to remove Marilin Wallace as Registrar of the Industrial Court. Wallace is seeking judicial review in the High Court against the commission’s decision to remove her. She is contending that action was taken against her because she questioned a number of expenses under “entertainment allowances” requested by certain judges of the court.  Wallace’s attorney, Khemraj Harrikissoon, had requested the judge to strike out several paragraphs of Hay’s affidavit and that of Michael Mahabir, director of Personnel Administration, on the ground that it was hearsay and opinion-evidence. Hay swore to an affidavit on the commissioners’ behalf, in which she outlined what transpired at a meeting when the decision was taken to terminate Wallace. Instead of Hay’s affidavit, the court should be apprised, attorney Harrikissoon argued, of direct evidence from the commissioners.

The commission is being represented by Martin Daly SC, instructed by State Attorney Nadine Nabie. Delivering a written ruling yesterday on the issue, Justice Jamadar stated that Hay, as secretary to the commission, was present at the meeting of the commissioners when the decision was taken to consider Wallace’s position. Given her status and responsibilities, the judge ruled, Hay is presumed competent and capable of accurately perceiving, noting and recording what transpired at that meeting. Jamadar further ruled that given the fact that the meeting was a collective one, it was understandable that Hay’s perception of what transpired, involved a mixture of fact and interpretation. “Such perceptions are, in the circumstances, admissible as direct evidence even if their factual content included a measure of relevant cognitive interpretation.” The judge also ruled that Mahabir can also give evidence directly, because he had access to all the records and files in respect of Wallace’s matter. And even though his evidence may border on opinion, the judge ruled that such could either be corroborated or disputed by Hay’s. Jamadar, however, struck out one paragraph and two sentences of Mahabir affidavit, deeming it pure opinion evidence. The case comes up for hearing on Friday.