Attorney: Magistrate has no power to try indictable offences summarily

MAGISTRATES do not have the power to proceed summarily with an indictable offence of trafficking in narcotics, Senior Counsel Pamela Elder argued yesterday before the Court of Appeal. She said the only person who has such power is the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP). She submitted that the trial and conviction of David Sandiford for trafficking in narcotics were null since the DPP’s consent had not been obtained by the magistrate to proceed summarily with the indictable offence. Elder further argued that Sandiford is not guilty since the decision of the magistrate is unreasonable and cannot be supported by the evidence. The magistrate, Elder said, did not give a balanced analysis of the evidence.

Sandiford was sentenced to 48 months hard labour after a Couva Magistrate found him guilty of having cocaine in his underwear on February 9, 2001, at Claxton Bay. His appeal was heard yesterday before Justice Margot Warner and Justice Ivor Archie. The State was represented by senior prosecutor Trevor Ward. Elder reminded the court that when the Dangerous Drugs Act was amended in 2000, certain offences, including trafficking in narcotics,  were removed from the second schedule of the Summarily Court Act. These offences can now only be tried summarily by consent of the DPP. She said the magistrate was wrong to try Sandiford’s case  summarily. Elder further  argued that what the magistrate considered weak factors in the defence’s  case were in fact impotent factors in the prosecution’s case.

She said the magistrate relied on a perceived discrepancy in Sandiford’s evidence and that of his witness. She said the magistrate stated that Sandiford testified that he was standing at the side of the road awaiting a car to bring him into Port-of-Spain, yet his witness placed him at the side of a garage. However, the transcript of evidence reveals no such discrepancy.  Elder then asserted that the magistrate convicted Sandiford on a flawed view of evidence. The court reserved its judgment, noting that it was the first time the point about magistrates’ power in summary matters was raised, and it would be necessary for the court to give some guidance.