That 1990 fiasco

Last week, I gave a senior security official a complimentary copy of my 1993 book, A Society Under Siege: A Study of Political Confusion and Legal Mysticism, which examined that 1990 fiasco. After reading it, he said, “Professor, you know nothing much has changed.” And recently, Abu Bakr himself boldly declared to the country: “You know what’s the genesis of this whole thing? The politicians were dealing drugs and they killed Bernadette James. That is the genesis and if something like this happens again, we may very well do the same thing.” (Newsday, July 27) Abu Bakr’s continued media legitimacy thrives on our system failures.

That is what happened in the days before July 27, 1990. And two weeks ago, at a Parliamentary Joint Select Committee chaired by Minister Fitzgerald Hinds, the country heard of the disturbing extent to which containers are allowed free passage through the ports.

You can talk about porous Cedros, about illegal transshipments from South America etc, but what about having scanners that can’t work, about importers being trusted to check their own goods. And above all, you really not sure whom to blame. Illegal guns were a major issue in 1990. It is worse today.

On January 20, 1993 – 30 months after the insurrection, I had a faceto- face discussion with Abu Bakr at UWI on the possible causes of his action, the controversial amnesty and his views of society. He still sees himself as a moral crusader – by default – implying that the society has no moral compass.

He said: “I don’t think the society as a whole has any goal they want to work towards. We have separate groups with each group having its own interest. Each group goes along with the political directorate only for political patronage.” Unfortunately, this is the exploitation of Westminster-style party politics – pragmatic and largely self-serving. What about guns? He replied: “No, I did not have those guns you speak about.

It was a temporary measure. We had a problem that we attempted to solve through the means valuable – that of the court. The military occupation sparked the July 27 crisis.” Abu Bakr refused to appear before the 2014 Commission of Enquiry.

I appeared twice when I told the Commission that three major drivers of the insurrection – illegal as it was - were (1) the police-army occupation of the Mucurapo lands, (2) the protracted controversies over Muslimeen ownership of the land and (3) the dilly-dallying inefficiencies of court trials. Other related elements fell between – such as his frustrations in getting permission to import medicine, etc. I told the Commission that the 1990 story will never be complete without examining complaints against trial delays. Up to today, that judicial challenge exists.

When Commission chairman, Sir David Simmons asked if today’s increase in crime is due to the Muslimeen actions, I said no.

The increase largely has to do with a gradual constellation of factors - from weak policing and intelligence gathering, low detection rates, easy entry of illegal guns and drugs, family breakdown, frustrating court delays, frustrated dropouts and failures from secondary school, etc.

Yes, it turned out to be a murderous attack, but, as evidenced by the Commission of Enquiry, it was an attack on a vulnerable democracy with institutions too weak and fractured to prevent it.

The front cover of my 1993 book states: “As the Muslimeen held their guns at the throat of the Prime Minister and cabinet ministers on July 27, 1990, Trinidad and Tobago went into a state of panic, pain and passion. The widespread lawlessness in the society provided a receptive environment for the Muslimeen action. Law and order must rest on a widespread framework of political accountab i l i ty, judicial efficiency and p u b l i c morality.” I still stand by this..