Was Guyana treated fairly in TT/Venezuela agreement

The Editor: I happened to be abroad when Newsday published Stephen Kangal’s “Commentary” of Sunday March 28 2004, replying to my letter of March 5 commenting on one of his previous articles on the 1990 TT-Venezuela maritime boundary agreement; but it has since come to my attention. Unlike Mr Kangal, I have no pretensions to being an expert in the international law of the sea. I am simply a geographer with a law degree. Nevertheless, I would be grateful if you would allow me space to respond to his remarks.

I must concede that Mr Kangal is right in stating that Point 1 is not located exactly at the notional triple equidistance point between TT, Venezuela and Grenada, as stated by me for the sake of simplicity. However, he misses my essential point, which is that the treaty states that the northern end of the demarcation line is located at a point (an indefinite distance north of Point 1) at which the projection of the equidistance line between TT and Venezuela meets the jurisdiction of a third State, namely Grenada; whereas there is no mention of a third State at the other end of the line, where the interests of Guyana intervene. If the treaty had not been designed to ignore Guyanas interests, as I contend, the agreed maritime boundary would likewise have been defined as ending in the southeast at a point east of Point 20 where the projection of the median line between TT and Venezuela meets the jurisdiction of a third State, namely Guyana.

When I mention the median line in this context it is not because I hold the misconceived view that the equidistant method is obligatory. The fact is that for the most part the agreed maritime boundary line between TT and Venezuela in the Serpents Mouth and Columbus Channel is the median line. From Point 9, which is the same as Point B under the 1942 Anglo-Venezuelan treaty, to Point 13, which is in approximately the same location as the 1942 Point X, a new equidistance line replaces the former treaty line and extends to Point 15. Likewise the boundary from Point 19 to Point 20 is a strict equidistance line. Only through Points 16 to 18, covering less than one third of the distance between Points 9 and 20, has the equidistance line been modified, because of pre-existing oil and gas concessions granted by TT which encroached slightly on the Venezuela side of the median line.

And this is really the nub of the problem. In his statement to Parliament on June 22 1990, Senator Sahadeo Basdeo, then Minister of External Affairs, stated that TT had previously held the position that it could negotiate no further than the notional triple equidistance point where the interests of TT, Venezuela and Guyana would meet and overlap, since tripartite negotiations would be necessary beyond that point, but that TT abandoned that position in September 1986. In that speech, he gave no reason for this change of policy; but in a subsequent interview  the Minister revealed that Venezuela exacted from TT, agreement to the delimitation of the boundary out to the 200 nautical mile limit of the EEZ as a condition for agreeing to preserve TTs oil and gas concessions between Points 15 and 19.

To comply with this condition, TT would have had to conclude a treaty which went beyond the notional triple equidistance point between TT, Venezuela and Guyana, which is only 117 miles offshore. Given its claim to the Essequibo Region, Venezuela would never have agreed to tripartite negotiations. To achieve agreement, therefore, TT had to find a pretext for excluding Guyana from the negotiation of the boundary line in an area where the marine claims of TT and Guyana met and overlapped. Hence, whilst eschewing the applicability of the equidistance method, TT concluded an agreement with Venezuela by the simple expedient of stepping the boundary back from the median line between TT and Guyana and claiming to have unilaterally granted Venezuela a ?Salida del Atlantico. This permits Venezuela to maintain the fiction that Guyanas marine areas west of the Essequibo River belong to Venezuela. Is it any wonder that Guyana immediately protested to the UN against this invidious agreement?

One of the assertions made by Mr. Kangal in his article is that, while TT and Venezuela can lawfully assert an interest to the resources of the Continental Shelf out to Point 22, which is more than 200 but less than 350 nautical miles from all the countries concerned, there is no evidence readily available to speculate far less conclude that Guyanas ? natural prolongation extends this far into the deep Atlantic. Any schoolchild looking at a bathymetric map of the region will observe that TT is sitting on the Continental Shelf of South America. In fact, to use one of Morgan Jobs more memorable phrases, Trinidad is just an obstruction in the mouth of the Orinoco River. Guyana is located on the coast of South America. One would have to have a rush of jingoistic blood and abandon all logic to argue that a point at the edge of the Continental Shelf of South America lying east of TT and north of Guyana is a natural prolongation of the submarine area under TTs jurisdiction but not that of Guyana.

Christine Toppin-Allahar
Attorney-at-Law