No superior rights

YESTERDAY we published the entire judgment delivered by the Privy Council in the matter arising from Justice Lionel Jones’ banning of the Press from publishing certain preliminary developments in the Dole Chadee murder trial eight years ago. We have done so because we believe the judgment brings to a final resolution a significant episode in our history, one that, moreover, holds vital lessons for  those who practise the profession of journalism in our country.

For members of the legal profession, the judgment will also be valuable since it comprises an indepth foray into the law governing the question of contempt of court as it affects judicial orders against the publication of certain matters by newspapers. The ban imposed by Justice Jones created a furore among certain sections of the media. Two journalists who defied it by reporting and commenting on the prohibition were charged for contempt, found guilty and penalised. One weekly newspaper, now defunct, sought redress, together with the journalists, for what they saw as a violation of their constitutional rights. These were the matters which were finally concluded by the Law Lords last week.

This newspaper took no part in the visceral and frenzied journalistic outcry against Justice Jones. The reason for that was simple; having covered the Dole Chadee murder trial in detail from the very beginning, we understood the motive of the judge in issuing such a ban. While we are as vigilant and fearless as any Press organisation in defending the freedoms we enjoy, we do not believe that ours is a “superior” right which entitles us to infringe upon or override the rights given to others under the constitution, including the right of all citizens to a free and fair trial. We were surprised that such a simple concept, one underpinning our social order, could be lost on such a wide section of the journalistic community. It was clear from the beginning that enormous pre-trial publicity about the case and, in particular, about Dole Chadee himself, would present a unique problem for Justice Jones, especially since the defence, in a preliminary motion, contended that because of it the accused would not be able to obtain a fair trial.

It was difficult, also, not to agree with the judge’s order since it was based on a request by defence counsel Peter Thornton QC with no objection from Timothy Cassell leading the prosecution. Thornton argued that publishing, before the start of the trial, the fact that Levi Morris, one of the accused, had decided to plead guilty to four counts of murder and testify against the co-accused would have been prejudicial. In their lengthy 34-page judgment, the Law Lords clearly supported the reason and the motive behind Justice Jones’ ban since they referred to several cases in which judges in the UK and even Canada had to order similar prohibitions on the Press in order “to serve the ends of justice.”

The Privy Council’s ruling should come as a painful but chastening disappointment to all those outraged champions of press freedom who had confidently anticipated a ringing endorsement of their right from the Law Lords and a strong censure of Justice Jones. While the Board members concluded that, under the common law, Justice Jones had no power to make such an order they pointed out that it would have been more desirable for him to warn the press that they would be at risk of contempt proceedings were they to publish the matter in question. Dole Chadee was entitled to a fair trial, a right as inalienable as ours to press freedom. In our view, Justice Jones must be commended for seeking to preserve it.