Sentencing of Attin offends Constitution

The State yesterday conceded that the sentencing of convicted killer Chuck Attin was unconstitutional. But only so far as the Children Act, under which he was sentenced, had wrongly put the sentencing power in the hands of the Executive instead of the Judiciary. The State also conceded that two sections of the Children Act,  sections 79 and 81, which related to the sentencing of minors convicted of murder were inconsistent with the underlying principles of the Constitution, namely the separation of powers. As a result of the constitutional issues raised by Attin’s attorneys Dana Seetahal and Keith Scotland, he may have his sentence reviewed by the Court.

Attin was 16 years old when he and his partner in crime, Noel Seepersad, had raped and murdered Candace Scott and Karen Sa Gomes at Westmoorings on July 11, 1994.  Because of his age, he could not have been sentenced to death by hanging like his accomplice Seepersad. Instead, he was sentenced under the Children Act at the “State’s pleasure.” A recent Privy Council ruling in a Jamaican case noted the unconstitutionality of legislation which does not follow the doctrine of separation of power and allows sentencing powers in the hands of the Executive instead of the Judiciary. Attorneys Andre de Vignes and Krishendath Narinesingh who represented the State conceded before Justice Alan Mendonca that some of the reliefs sought by Seetahal in her motion offend the constitution. De Vignes also agreed that the court has the power to modify these sections of the Children Act and substitute the offending words:  “State’s power” to “Court’s power.”

Seetahal had also asked the court for an order that Attin be brought before the court for a periodic review of his detention at least every three years. Both parties also agreed that before going any further, they should await the ruling of the Court of Appeal which will be dealing with some of the issues raised in the motion when the court hears the appeal of Keston Adams on September 25. As a result, the matter was listed for mention on October 6.