Distribution of power

Also germane to the issue of distribution of power is a diffusion of centres of power and decision-making which reduces the concentration of power in a few hands and makes for a more viable democracy. In our case the limited option is to devolve greater functions and powers to local government bodies, which will be discussed later. Constitutional reform should address the issue of a balance between the need for the Executive to carry out its duties and responsibilities efficiently without undue hindrance and restrictions and the necessity to have a system of oversight, supervision and accountability designed to restrain Executive excess.

In the case of TT, there is ample evidence to suggest that there is an overwhelming degree of Executive dominance and little by way of check, review and reconsideration. The priority focus of constitutional reform should therefore be some form of diminution of the power of the Executive (PM and Cabinet) and enhancement of the role, function and authority of the presidency (which is in reality only nominally part of the Executive), the Legislature and local government bodies.

We may begin with a discussion on the functions and powers of the presidency and how these could be increased in the interest of greater dispersal of power and a more meaningful role for the occupant of that office. Let me at the outset state that I am not in favour of the proposal for an executive presidency in this country. Our history, political evolution and local circumstances do not justify it. It will, in my view, institute a greater degree of autocratic and dictatorial rule but this will have to be dealt with at another time.

Under our Constitution, the President has largely ceremonial functions and very limited powers. He can make official speeches, appoint independent senators and certain members of a few commissions at his own discretion. In other instances he makes appointments to key state offices after consultation with the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition. It is inconceivable that the President will appoint someone to whom the Prime Minister raises serious objection.

In carrying out the vast majority of his functions, he must act in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister or Cabinet, whether it is to appoint ministers, assent to Bills passed by Parliament, set up commissions of enquiry or dissolve Parliament.

Moreover, while the President may proclaim his independence, he is perceived to be an appointee of the governing party. This is so because his nomination is initiated by the party in power and approved by an Electoral College comprising only members of the House of Representatives and Senate, in each of which the governing party has a majority.

In pursuit of the principle of greater diffusion of power and the consequent strengthening of the authority and enlarging of the discretion of the President, particularly in relation to the political Executive and the Legislature, it is my view that relevant recommendations for constitutional reform should be adopted. The Wooding Commission in its report of 1974 put forward certain proposals which seem to be eminently sensible:

1. The President should have the power to refer Bills once back to the Legislature for reconsideration if majority public opinion seems to be opposed.

2. The President should play the major role in appointing people to offices of state after such consultation as he deems fit but subject to ratification by the Legislature. It would minimise the contentious accusations of partisanship against holders of important posts.

3. The President should have a discretion with respect to the dissolution of Parliament on the advice of the Prime Minister and holding of general elections before the expiry date of the parliamentary term, except where a vote of no-confidence in the Government has been passed by Parliament. The exercise of such a discretion may minimise the need for multiple elections during the course of a parliamentary term.

However, if the President’s powers should be expanded as recommended above, then it only seems reasonable that his election should not be narrowly-based as it is at present, confined merely to members of both Houses of Parliament. Since an executive presidency is not advocated, there is no need for the President to be elected by the electorate at large. I am of the view that the present Electoral College should be expanded to include (a) members of local government bodies, (b) representatives of recognised business associations, © representatives of trade union groupings, and (d) representatives of some of the larger NGOs. The overall total should not exceed 300 people. In this way the President will be viewed as having a mandate from a wider cross- section of the citizenry.