Local govt reform revisited

IF IT IS proposed to give local government bodies more powers, responsibilities and resources, then it stands to reason that the arena for political patronage, nepotism, misdirection of funds and leakages will be enlarged. It is quite noticeable that, for the coming local government election, many former Members of Parliament and other retired public officials have submitted their numbers to be considered for appointment as aldermen.

It is necessary to put in place a robust form of accountability — both financial and political — in order to minimise the mismanagement of funds, to obtain value for money spent and to improve performance and productivity levels.

There is, in addition and perhaps more importantly, the need for the ongoing monitoring of the stewardship of the local government representatives within their threeyear term of office.

Representatives of the current administration have spoken about the issue of accountability but in rather vague and general terms without specifics.

For example, Prime Minister Dr Keith Rowley at a local government reform consultation in June, at the Diego Martin North Secondary School, had intimated that “…if accountability is put in place and people can be identified for what they are responsible for, where money is going, who is getting it and what work is being done, then the new system might have a chance of improving the quality of lives.” The operational mechanics of that accountability has not been elaborated.

The current system is that the establishment officers of the local government corporations are appointed, transferred and disciplined by the Statutory Authorities Service Commission. These officers are not accountable to the regional corporation for their performance but to the distant Ministry of Local Government. Chief executive officers have been known to be openly defiant and uncooperative.

From a management point of view, such a situation is patently untenable. I have proposed that, with the necessary assistance and safeguards, the establishment staff should be appointed by the local government corporations themselves and be accountable to them and have the authority to impose sanctions for non-performance.

Since, under the reform proposals, the local government corporations would no longer be accountable to the Executive for their performance and financial stewardship, they ought to be accountable to some national institution otherwise they may become a law unto themselves. The only other suitable institution to carry out this function is Parliament.

Accordingly, I have proposed that a special local government committee of Parliament be established and dedicated to oversee local government bodies through a system of biannual reporting and interrogation on expenditures incurred and execution of plans, programmes and priorities.

Financial accountability also incorporates systems of internal and external audit. Currently there is uncertainty as to whether the local government bodies are subject to any system of arm’s-length internal audit and if there is such an operation, to whom do the internal auditors report and what corrective actions and sanctions, if any, have been employed as a result. The same can be said of external auditors whose reports should be readily available to the public.

It is therefore imperative that systems of robust financial accountability to include value-for-money assessments should accompany the implementation of any reform as I have argued in my columns. In addition, regulations for procurement by local government bodies should be established and their compliance monitored by audit.

On the very thorny issue of political accountability, the reforms must focus on the performance of councillors during their term of office.

The current situation is that councillors are in theory accountable to the residents in their electoral districts and should seek their inputs in decision-making.

This interaction, however, hardly takes place and there is no mechanism to institutionalise accountabi l i ty.

In reality, counc i l l o r s s e e m accountable to no one.