Parliament vs Cabinet

Last month’s parliamentary motion by my friend, Senator Wade Mark, on “parliamentary autonomy” attracted my interest for a number of reasons, one of course, being my own experience as Independent Senator for over 12 years.

This column does not necessarily disagree with the motion, but uses the opportunity to briefly raise a few issues over Mark’s subsequent proposition for “administrative autonomy, financial autonomy and institutional autonomy.”( Hansard) Mark argued for a parliament with stronger powers so as to control and check cabinet policy- making powers as well. “A strong parliament represents a strong democracy, a strong legislature means a very powerful and independent body that can hold the executive to account and, if necessary, dismiss a prime minister.

We must have that power,” he declared, and with “Markian passion,” exceeding the motion’s “financial and administrative autonomy.” He also spoke about full-time MP.s. He added: “Parliament cannot continue to be the plaything of the executive.” “Institutional autonomy” has political implications.

As Minister Gopee-Scoon replied, her government has some sympathy for “financial autonomy,” but pending further clarification, especially on institutional autonomy, it’s not a matter that should be “rushed to a joint select committee,” and further, the population should also have a say, etc.

This debate, as I said, reminds me of the executive president debate a few years ago. The proposal was for an elected MP to be nominated and approved by majority vote to be executive president who will then choose the 25 member cabinet – nine MPs, 16 outside. A half-way US model.

Note: As long as the prime minister appoints the cabinet, as long as the cabinet is drawn from the majority party in parliament and the Westminster controls applied, there would be great difficulty in having a parliament so strong so as to control or even over-ride the cabinet and government.

More precisely, our Constitution states: “There shall be a Cabinet for Trinidad and Tobago which the Cabinet shall have the general direction and control of the government and shall be collectively responsible therefore to Parliament.”(Section 7(1)) What does “collectively responsible” mean? If it means the executive is accountable, as I think it does, such accountability is in effect limited even when the Constitution states: “Parliament may make laws for the peace, order and good government of Trinidad and Tobago.”(Section 53) The Constitution further states: “The Cabinet shall consist of the Prime Minister and such number of other Ministers (of whom one shall be the Attorney General)…as the Prime Minister considers appropriate.” Section 75(2) This is the executive whose party and government are directly accountable to the population.

So the question now is really this: Who should control parliament? And if “independence” and parallel executive powers are to be given to a multi-party parliament, how much recalibration and political adjustments would be necessary? Especially in a multi-party parliament with political alliances.

Some constitutional and electoral changes would be required.

Senator Mark’s intervention encourages us to re-visit constitution reform.

In its reference to having a president as both “Head of State and Head of Government,” the Wooding Constitution Commission (1974) stated: “The overwhelming majority of people (consulted) advocated a largely ceremonial Head of State who would have some powers in the appointment to offices of a national character. If the President were to be both Head of State and Head of Government, he would have to be elected by all the people.” Sixteen years later, also struggling to find a presidential balance between government and parliament, the Hyatali Constitution Commission argued for “joint agreement between the Prime Minister and Opposition Leader,” then through the Speaker, put the nomination before the Electoral College. Like Mark’s motion, and as we look back, democ r a c y is always a work in progress.