CJ slams Tax Board over consent order

The appellate court also took note of the unnecessary legal costs the parties would have to face because of the TAB error, and instead of sending the matter back to the board, the Appeal Court directed that the consent order be entered in terms of the agreement filed by both parties.

The court made the point in a judgment delivered yesterday by Chief Justice Satnarine Sharma between Trinidad and Tobago National Petroleum Marketing Company, and the Board of Inland Revenue (BIR).

The company had appealed to the TAB over matters with the BIR, but eventually the two parties had reached an agreement and went to the TAB with a consent order. However, the board refused to accept the order and proceeded to set a date for trial. The company appealed and was later joined by the BIR. The appeal came up before the CJ and Justices Margot Warner and Ivor Archie. Representing the company was Myrna Robinson-Walters, while Nasim Mohammed represented BIR.

In his judgment, the CJ said, "In every civilised system of justice, the main function of the courts is to resolve disputes defined by the parties and brought before the courts, seeking a speedy judicial resolution. It is always desirable however if the parties can settle the disputes themselves, in or out of court.

"The courts oftentimes play a very significant and pivotal role in such resolutions.

The wisdom of such an approach can never be overstated. Indeed, this approach is at the heart of the New Civil Proceeding Rules.

These factors are crucial and fundamental to an effective contemporary system of justice.

"When therefore parties have agreed to settle disputes between themselves at any stage of court proceedings, the Civil Court is under an obligation to conform to the wishes of the parties — unless, to do so, would be illegal.

"When a court fails without good reason to respect the wishes of the parties, this will inevitably undermine the administration of justice. This is sadly exemplified on the facts of this case.

"The record in these proceedings shows that the TAB not only refused to enter the consent order but also fixed a trial date, which would undoubtedly increase costs and judicial time will have been squandered. In fact, both parties have come to this court for relief, which in our view could have easily been granted by the TAB.

"The question to be raised here is — who should bear these unnecessary costs? I have merely posed this question in the hope that those charged with judicial functions would reflect upon the damage done to the administration of justice, the concomitant hardship caused and added legal expenses incurred by the parties."

The initial dispute, which led to the court matter, arose when the BIR had assessed the company tax and unemployment levy liabilities for the years of income 1992, 1993 and 1994.

The BIR had imposed an additional $96,360 for the income and $2,473,698.30 in respect of unemployment levy for the year 1992. The company appealed to the TAB. Similar appeals were lodged against the BIR for the other two years. However, the parties had reached an agreement and went to the board with a consent order on October 6, 2004.