Nuclear weapons proliferation

The break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 ended four decades during which the world lived in fear of extinction by nuclear conflagration. That comfort was initially deceptive, for those months of transition actually made it more, not less, likely that someone might launch a nuclear attack. But the disintegration of the USSR into separate states was accomplished with relative peace, and the world breathed easier. With just one super-power, the prospect of nuclear war now seemed less likely.

In retrospect, however, that prospect had been unlikely even before the Soviet Union collapsed.

Although nuclear weapons proliferation had been continually deplored, the hard fact of mutually assured destruction served to prevent the United States and the USSR from ever deploying nuclear weapons. But, although the world still has only one super-power, the nuclear threat still exists, albeit in a different form.

Last Monday, Iran resumed uranium conversion at its Isfahan plant. The decision was taken after Iran rejected a European Union offer of political and economic incentives in return for abandoning its nuclear programme. Iran insists that its programme is intended only for electricity generation. But it has also started developing a heavy water reactor, which Tehran says is intended for use in the pharmaceutical, biological and biotechnological fields. However, this kind of reactor can also be used to make plutonium for a nuclear bomb.

In response, US president George W Bush has reiterated that the "use of force" is an option that America may use to stop Iran’s nuclear programme. But Mr Bush may just be giving a warning snarl, while being reluctant to bite. The occupation of Iraq has already cost America dearly, and the American populace may be dead set against another Middle East engagement. Additionally, Mr Bush’s foreign relations with the world’s other major powers, already strained by his Iraq adventurism, may well collapse if he decides to attack Iran.

But these are short-term considerations. The most elastic estimates say that Iran can have nuclear power within ten years. (Other estimates say three.) And, despite its protestations of virtue, it is likely that Iran will develop nuclear weapons. The temptation of plutonium would be too much to resist - not least because Israel already has a bristling nuclear arsenal.

Meanwhile, other countries with nuclear capability and military insecurities stand on the sidelines — China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. China has had nuclear capability since 1964, but has never shown any inclination to build up its reserve. However, the US recently formed an economic alliance with India — a move which has the covert tactical intent of containing China. To that perceived threat, China, which has been concentrating on building its economy for the past quarter-century, may well turn its attention to military matters. And North Korea continues to play a game of blackmailing the West to shore up its collapsed economy.

The dangerous factor in this whole scenario is, ironically, the absence of mutually assured destruction. The United States, and all the developed nations, still have better delivery systems for their nuclear bombs.

That means that, in an extreme situation, they may see it as feasible to use these weapons in order to prevent attacks on their territories. This is the crisis that the world may have to face sooner or later, and how the US handles the Iran situation could decide whether the beast will wake or stay at rest.